Civil society in Central Asia: Living downstream from Russian authoritarianism

For more than a decade, the authorities in Russia have crafted an arsenal of repressive legislation to silence dissent and crush civil society.

Now, Central Asia is feeling the ripple effects.

From the foreign agents law adopted by Kyrgyzstan in 2024 to Kazakhstan’s registry of foreign-funded groups, the fingerprints of Russian influence are clear. Recently adopted legislation on “undesirable” individuals in Uzbekistan may differ from similar-sounding “undesirables” laws of Russia, but it nevertheless signals the potential for this kind of branding to spread to the region.

The proliferation of these measures is not coincidental.

Central Asia’s shared Soviet history, economic dependency on Moscow, and security ties have created fertile ground for the import of Russian-style legislation and rhetoric. As governments across the region increasingly borrow from Russia’s playbook, civil society organizations, activists, and independent media are facing mounting challenges. Laws targeting foreign funding, vague definitions of “political activities,” and state-sanctioned smear campaigns are shrinking the space for dissent, stifling advocacy, and silencing marginalized voices. This coordinated assault on civic freedoms threatens not only local communities but also the region’s ability to resist rising authoritarianism.

Following Russia’s playbook

Kyrgyzstan’s new law closely mirrors earlier versions of Russia’s “foreign agents” legislation. It requires civil society organizations (CSOs) that receive foreign funding and engage in vaguely defined “political activities” to register as “foreign representatives.” Noncompliance carries the threat of extrajudicial suspension of their activities. Similar to Russia’s law, organizations designated as foreign agents face burdensome reporting and labeling requirements, as well as intrusive inspections.

The adoption of this law has already had a chilling effect on Kyrgyzstan’s civil society.

Many human rights groups and other CSOs are reconsidering their partnerships with international organizations and foreign governments. Some have scaled back core activities such as advocacy and publishing policy recommendations, fearing these actions could be classified as “political” under the law. Others are shifting strategies, with members working individually as experts to avoid exposing their organizations to targeting under the legislation.

If Kyrgyzstan continues to follow Russia’s trajectory, these tactics are unlikely to succeed in the long term. Similar strategies adopted by Russian human rights groups have proven ineffective in avoiding persecution under comparable legislation.

Efforts adopted by Kazakhstan’s government to stigmatize civil society groups have rested on the release, in 2023, of a list of organizations receiving foreign funding. The evident intent was to cast them in a negative light and thereby undermine their credibility. Among those affected were prominent human rights groups and advocates.

In other echoes of dissent-busting measures commonly applied in Russia, local government officials across Kazakhstan frequently refuse to authorize peaceful gatherings and take punitive action against individuals involved in unsanctioned demonstrations. This year has already brought multiple instances of this practice. Authorities invoke vague justifications such as “threats to public order” to prevent people from mounting demonstrations.

A multi-prong assault

Governments in Central Asia prioritize controlling civic activity and suppressing dissent over fostering independent civil society. Their actions reflect a clear preference for maintaining authority rather than supporting genuine civic engagement, even as they claim to champion open societies and democratic values.

These governments employ a broad range of methods to achieve their objectives. At the relatively benign end, there is a reliance on government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), which are created and funded by the state to simulate civil society while undermining genuine civic organizations. These entities are often used to monopolize dialogue with international partners and overshadow independent activists.

Despite paying lip service to the value of open societies, these governments routinely resort to repression and violence when faced with dissent.

This trend has played out repeatedly across the region in recent years.

In Kazakhstan’s Bloody January of 2022, peaceful protests escalated into violence, reportedly hijacked by political elites and organized criminal groups. Authorities used disproportionate lethal force, killing over 200 civilians. The aftermath saw widespread torture and criminal prosecutions of alleged protesters, while security personnel responsible for abuses enjoyed near-total impunity.

In Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO), protests in late 2021 and mid-2022 resulted in the deaths of at least a dozen people, with many others tortured by military and law enforcement personnel. Civic activists faced lengthy prison sentences, and approximately 700 civil society organizations were shut down, effectively erasing most independent civic activity in the region.

In Uzbekistan’s Karakalpakstan region in the summer of 2022, protests against constitutional reforms that sought to change the region’s autonomous status were violently suppressed. Dozens of protesters were killed, activists were imprisoned, and transnational repression targeted those who fled the country seeking asylum.

This multi-pronged attack – combining GONGOs, repression, and state-sanctioned violence – has had a devastating impact on civil society organizations CSOs. Many groups have been forced to curtail or abandon core activities such as advocacy and public outreach, fearing accusations of political activity. Others have shut down entirely.

A difficult neighbourhood

Lack of access to funding poses yet another power challenge to CSOs in Central Asia. Funding in the region is patchy, sporadic, and often restricted to larger, well-established organizations, leaving smaller groups – particularly those in rural areas – struggling to stay afloat. This issue has now been compounded by recent developments, such as the U.S. State Department’s pause on foreign assistance, which creates even greater uncertainty. These interruptions risk weakening the already fragile networks of civil society across the region.

External pressures further exacerbate these difficulties. Civil society in Central Asia operates under conditions of interference and stress that are hard to imagine for organizations in regions where geopolitical dynamics are less intense. A glance at the neighbourhood on a map should make this point clear. Russia to the north; China to the east.

Both those countries are eager to impress their political philosophies on Central Asia. Their growing influence, coupled with reduced Western engagement, means CSOs in Central Asia must navigate a fraught and highly politicized environment, limiting their ability to act independently and effectively.

The geopolitical chessboard in which these organizations find themselves often leaves them stretched thin, forced to focus on survival over strategic growth or meaningful advocacy.

It is imperative for international donors to step in and provide strategic support to Central Asia’s civil society. This must be done thoughtfully, with an emphasis on achieving specific outcomes that strengthen resilience, foster adaptation, and empower local organizations to maintain their autonomy in the face of mounting challenges.

Without such carefully targeted interventions, the civic space in Central Asia may shrink further, to the detriment of the region’s long-term development and stability.