Second Central Asia-China summit: Initiatives and priorities

Cooperation between Central Asia and China is intensifying at an unprecedented rate.

The Second Central Asia–China Summit, held in the capital of Kazakhstan on June 17, reaffirmed the shared commitment to a long-term strategic partnership. This was formalized through the signing of the Treaty on Eternal Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation. 

Experts on China–Central Asia relations note that this summit signals China’s growing preference for a regional format of interaction. This regional model, in their view, is becoming more important than other external engagement mechanisms, such as the C5+ formats, and it now rests on a more robust institutional foundation.

This shift raises key questions: Does Central Asia have a collective regional vision for implementing strategic cooperation with China? Beyond bilateral engagement, can the region articulate and deliver cross-border projects that will contribute meaningfully to its long-term economic transformation in partnership with China?

Kazakhstan’s vision

The case of Kazakhstan offers insight into how bilateral ties and regional cooperation are likely to develop in parallel.

Although the regional dimension of China–Central Asia relations is gaining strength, the bilateral channel remains the cornerstone of practical engagement. A day before the summit, on June 16, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held a meeting with Chinese leader President Xi Jinping. That meeting led to the signing of 24 intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements covering a broad spectrum of cooperation areas, from infrastructure and industry to agriculture and innovation.

Tokayev described the current state of Kazakhstan–China relations as a “golden period,” highlighting their strategic nature and the substantial benefits they deliver to both economies. In his speech at the summit, Tokayev provided a detailed account of the progress made through bilateral economic cooperation. He reported that Kazakhstan’s trade turnover with China has reached $44 billion, Chinese investments have surpassed $26 billion, and approximately 5,000 enterprises with Chinese capital are operating in Kazakhstan.

Cargo transit volumes from China are steadily rising. In 2024, the total number of containers transported through Kazakhstan exceeded 211,000. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov also held a working meeting on the implementation of Kazakh–Chinese agreements, underscoring China’s central role in helping Kazakhstan meet its strategic investment target: attracting at least $150 billion in foreign investment by 2029. Bektenov highlighted that Chinese investors are currently involved in 224 industrial projects worth $66.4 billion, which are expected to generate around 50,000 new jobs.

Throughout the summit, numerous proposals were made to deepen cooperation between Central Asia and China.

Notably, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan presented the greatest number of initiatives. These proposals suggest that the region views China as a key partner in addressing pressing challenges related to industrialization and technological development. However, it was also acknowledged that such development is impossible without a sufficient pool of highly skilled professionals.

To respond to a lack of human capital, Kazakhstan has expressed its intent to establish “academies of engineers” and launch joint research laboratories with Chinese partners. These institutions are envisioned as hubs for training a new generation of technical specialists, who will be vital for the region’s economic modernization. These initiatives are also positioned as central pillars within the proposed long-term strategy for the Central Asia–China format for 2026–2030 – a strategy Kazakhstan has put forward for regional adoption.

Uzbekistan’s approach

Uzbekistan is equally ambitious in its plans to transform its economy through deepened engagement with China.

The country sees strategic value not only in accessing Chinese markets, but also in attracting Chinese investment, advanced technology, and logistical integration. At the summit, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev articulated several far-reaching proposals aimed at expanding cooperation in trade, industry, technology, and infrastructure.

Among the most significant of Tashkent’s initiatives were proposals to develop a long-term strategy titled Industrial and Infrastructure Belt Central Asia–China; establish a Central Asia–China Development Fund; and create an Interregional Council on Trade and Investment. The Uzbek side also proposed the creation of a regional center for industrial standardization and certification, to be based in Tashkent, which would facilitate alignment with Chinese regulatory frameworks and technical specifications.

Mirziyoyev paid particular attention to the concept of interconnected industrial clusters built with Chinese capital, technology, and scientific input. These clusters are envisioned as engines of economic diversification and regional connectivity. Additionally, the Uzbek leader stressed the importance of developing alternative corridors to ensure resilience in transit and logistics.

On the sidelines of the Astana summit, Xi and Mirziyoyev held a bilateral meeting. Xi emphasized the need for both countries to undertake more aggressive steps to liberalize and simplify trade procedures. He also highlighted the importance of accelerating construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, a project he described as essential for deepening comprehensive cooperation.

From the perspective of Uzbek experts, one of the critical problems currently facing regional transit is the imbalance in goods transportation to Europe. Kazakhstan currently accounts for more than 93% of total transit volume, while Uzbekistan’s share remains at a modest 2.3%. This imbalance underscores the urgency of diversifying transit infrastructure.

Projects such as the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway corridor are therefore seen as essential for strengthening Uzbekistan’s position as a regional transit hub. Supporting this ambition, Uzbekistan has already successfully conducted its first pilot freight shipmentalong the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan–China–Mongolia road route. The Uzbek national carrier covered the 4,500-kilometer route in just eight days, showcasing the country’s growing logistical capabilities.

What are China’s priorities?

While the summit generated a host of economic initiatives, China’s underlying priorities remain firmly rooted in its own and regional security. In light of ongoing instability in South Asia and the Middle East, China places a high premium on ensuring political stability in Central Asia. That is a precondition for the reliable operation of the transit corridors it is investing in.

Energy security also remains central to China’s regional agenda. Despite international rhetoric on the green transition, China continues to pursue strategic cooperation in oil and gas with Central Asian countries, given the growing volatility in other energy-exporting regions. In Astana, Xi also met with Turkmen President Serdar Berdymukhamedov to discuss expanding cooperation in natural gas. Berdymukhamedov confirmed Turkmenistan’s willingness to increase exports.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry, its national oil company KazMunayGas, and China’s CNOOC signed an agreement for exploration and production within the Zhylyoi project, located in the northeastern Caspian Sea, a strategic transit zone. Such developments make it clear that conventional energy cooperation will continue to serve as a foundation of China–Central Asia relations.

Another strategic priority for Beijing is the development of Xinjiang as a gateway to Central Asia, a trade and technology hub that can underpin China’s western-facing economic agenda. This underscores the importance China places on liberalizing mutual trade, a point Xi reiterated in meetings with his Central Asian counterparts.

Yet, as Xi noted, structural challenges persist. Despite extensive economic reforms, Uzbekistan remains the most closed market in the region. For the broader China–Central Asia partnership to flourish, this asymmetry will need to be addressed through regulatory harmonization and institutional reform.

Conclusions and recommendations

Based on the agreements signed and the initiatives announced at the Astana summit, it is evident that the strategic partnership between Central Asia and China is not only expanding in scope but also deepening in ambition. 

But several complex challenges must be addressed for this partnership to be truly transformative.

First, while all Central Asian countries are eager to access the Chinese market, doing so will require significant domestic investment in product quality, certification systems, and standards compliance. Without these, the region risks falling short of its export ambitions. The same applies to initiatives around industrial cooperation, technology transfer, and the creation of innovation hubs, areas where China excels but where Central Asia still lags.

Second, the technological partnership between China and Central Asia is only just beginning. There are positive signs: China has already transferred a supercomputer to Kazakhstan, and plans are underway to establish 25 ICT centers across the country in cooperation with Huawei. Uzbekistan recently opened its Digital Technology Center in Shanghai, in partnership with Shanghai Oriental Credits, with the goal of promoting Uzbek IT exports and expanding technological cooperation. The Eximbank of China has pledged $500 million for the development of Uzbekistan’s IT sector. Still, innovation financing across the region remains limited. For the region to attract top-tier Chinese companies and foster meaningful tech partnerships, it must dramatically increase its own investment in R&D and innovation ecosystems.

Crucially, the outcome of such cooperation should be more than just inward technology transfer. It should result in the development of indigenous innovation and long-term technological sovereignty for Central Asia.

Third, the summit revealed a lack of large-scale regional projects that involve all five Central Asian countries. Current flagship initiatives, such as the Middle Corridor or the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, are mostly country-specific. To fully unlock the potential of regional cooperation with China, Central Asia needs to identify and develop joint projects that enhance shared prosperity. Doing so would also reduce the risk of countries competing against each other for Chinese investment, which could lead to regional fragmentation rather than integration.

Fourth, there is a pressing need to shift focus from traditional resource-based cooperation to green energy and technology. Central Asian states should capitalize on China’s leadership in these areas to drive their own energy transition, create new regional markets, and secure a position within global supply chains for renewables and clean tech.

Finally, regional governments must recognize that deeper cooperation with China will bring greater competition with Chinese firms. To meet this challenge, significant investments are needed in human capital development, entrepreneurial capacity, and innovation ecosystems. Enhancing the competitiveness of Central Asia’s workforce and private sector is essential to ensuring that the benefits of cooperation are shared and sustainable.

In summary, the key to maximizing the benefits of engagement with China lies not only in attracting investment but in using that engagement to improve competitiveness, foster regional integration, and build a foundation for long-term resilience and prosperity.

Azimzhan Khitakhunov is a senior research fellow at CAPS Unlock, specializing in macroeconomics and regional integration in Central Asia.