Shyngys Zipatolla 
May 15, 2025 
6 min read 
Photo: Delegation of the European Union in Kazakhstan.
Turbulent geopolitics and the scramble for secure energy and critical raw materials are pushing Central Asia to the forefront of the European Union’s foreign policy agenda.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan collectively offer what the EU urgently needs: abundant oil and gas, as well as key resources like copper, lithium, and nickel.
The real challenge lies in getting those resources to market, particularly to Europe, through reliable routes. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened the urgency of finding alternatives to the Russian-controlled Northern Corridor.
The EU’s response to date has focused on renewing its interest in the so-called Middle Corridor, a trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, continuing through either Georgia and the Black Sea or Turkey. Kazakhstan is already using this corridor to export uranium and oil.
There is a lot of work that needs to be done. In 2024, the capacity of the Middle Corridor was only 6 million tons, as compared to over 100 million tons on the Russian route.
On paper, the financial commitments are impressive.
At the Investors Forum for EU-Central Asia Transport Connectivity in January 2024, €10 billion ($11 billion) was pledged for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. This was followed by a further €12 billion Global Gateway investment package announced at the first EU-Central Asia Summit in Uzbekistan in April 2025.
But as I argue in a newly published policy brief, produced with support from CAPS Unlock and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), this agenda will only succeed if the EU adjusts its current course. Funding must become more targeted, climate-smart, and grounded in effective collaboration.
For the Middle Corridor to succeed, addressing climate impacts is imperative.
While the EU’s flagship Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy, and Climate, alongside the €6.5 billion allocated to these sectors as part of the €12 billion of spending announced in April, hold promise, its scope is currently too broad to address the region’s specific challenges.
With a more targeted approach, this initiative could effectively support the decarbonization of road, rail, and waterway transport along the Middle Corridor, especially as traffic volumes grow. Electrifying railways and integrating them with renewable energy sources are key opportunities.
Efforts should center on enhancing logistics, optimizing transport planning, reducing energy consumption, and digitally supporting green projects. Rather than dispersing billions across loosely coordinated or overly ambitious efforts, such as saving the Aral Sea, the EU would benefit from setting focused, realistic goals.
There needs to be a shift away from sprawling megaprojects toward practical, scalable initiatives. Germany’s Rhenus Group, for example, is planning to build a container terminal at Aktau Port. That is an investment that addresses a real logistical bottleneck in Caspian Sea shipping. A unified electronic transit system is being piloted in Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to streamline border procedures and align with EU standards. These are the kinds of targeted efforts that can deliver near-term impact and reinforce the Middle Corridor’s viability.
By contrast, proposals such as constructing the world’s largest green hydrogen plant in Kazakhstan, which will require drawing 50 million cubic meters of water from the already receding Caspian Sea, risk doing more harm than good. While such projects are visionary, their environmental costs and logistical complexity make them difficult to justify. More manageable and ecologically sustainable alternatives, such as hydrogen production for fertiliser, may be better aligned with both regional needs and EU sustainability goals.
The €22 billion worth of EU pledges made so far sounds like a big number. The reality is that it is nowhere near enough. Brussels cannot realistically assume the full burden for what is needed to enable the Middle Corridor to reach its full potential. The corridor, after all, needs around €18.5 billion for its most urgent upgrades alone.
There are potential solutions, however.
The Asian Development Bank and Gulf countries, like the United Arab Emirates, have money, a track record in funding and building infrastructure, and are already active in the region. Working more closely with those partners could open up the prospect of cheaper credit and bring in other investors from Asia.
But even the money that is on the table may not be fully deliverable.
A major problem lies in how the EU tries to fund infrastructure: through a mechanism called EFSD+, which doesn’t directly spend billions but instead offers guarantees to attract outside investors. In theory, this should mobilize both public and private finance. In practice, it often proves slow, bureaucratic, and unreliable. This is especially the case in a region like Central Asia, where investors see high risks and low returns.
The result is a gap between headline pledges and real-world impact.
The Middle Corridor is not just a transportation solution.
It is a test.
A test of whether the EU can think both big and small, whether it has the breadth of vision to respond to seismic geopolitical shifts while also taking stock of the needs of ordinary citizens in the regions with which it engages.
Good intentions and impressive pledges are not enough.
What’s needed now is targeted funding, workable partnerships, and a commitment to doing fewer things better.
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